Call, S. and Waters, K. (2024) ‘ The European Union as a Target: When Do Democratic Backsliders Rhetorically Challenge the EU?’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13641.
Call, Samantha, and Seth Jolly. “Euroscepticism in the Populism Era.” The Journal of Politics 82, no. 1 (January 2020): e7–12. https://doi.org/10.1086/706457.
Populism
Democratic Backsliding
Democratization
Comparative Institutions
Identity in Politics
Political Behavior
"Explaining Authoritarian Populist Behavior in Episodes of Democratic Backsliding"
I study how authoritarian populists carry out democratic backsliding. In my dissertation, I ask why authoritarian populists target some democratic institutions for backsliding but not others. For example, why did Trump target the media so heavily, but not the Supreme Court? I argue that institutions are targeted or not targeted based on the level of threat they pose to the authoritarian populist. Their level of threat depends on how many checks they have on executive power and how likely it is those checks will be used. When an institution has checks and those checks are likely to be used, it is a high threat and will be targeted by the authoritarian populist.
I also investigate how authoritarian populists target high threat institutions. I find it happens in one of two ways: rhetorically or through direct action. The choice between the two, I theorize, depends on public opinion. Popular institutions will be targeted rhetorically first to diminish public trust and reduce the possibility of electoral backlash, and then will be directly targeted. Unpopular institutions, by contrast, will be targeted immediately through direct action.
I test my theory using three country-level case studies: Hungary, the United States, and Brazil. Within each country, I use qualitative data analysis to determine whether my theory can explain the targeting of the judiciary, legislature, electoral system, and media.